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(1985) 
49-11-1. Short title - Scope. This act is known as the Utah 
Public Safety Retirement Act. It shall include in its coverage 
all public employees engaged full time in public safety work under 
this chapter, except a public employee serving as the commissioner 
of public safety, or as the elected or appointed sheriff or chief 
of police of a public safety organization, if that public employee 
files a formal written request seeking exclusion from coverage, 
but the public employee cannot continue employment in the same 
covered employer unit and receive payment from the retirement 
office at the same time. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case to determine the applicability of an amendment to 
49-11-1, U.C.A. 1933, as amended (S.B. 57) which became law in March, 
1985, after signing by the Governor, to twenty-one police chiefs and 
sheriffs in the State of Utah. Judgment was entered for plaintiffs. 
The Utah State Legislature in 1983, at the request of various 
public safety officials, enacted House Bill 239 amending Section 1 of 
Title 49, Chapter 11, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, by adding to the para-
graph covering for purposes of participation in the Public Safety 
Retirement System ". . . all public employees engaged full time in 
public safety work . . .", an authorized exception as to certain such 
employees when it said " . . . except a public employee serving as the 
commissioner of public safety, or as the elected or appointed sheriff, 
a chief of police of a public safety organization if the public employee 
files a formal written request seeking exclusion from coverage.11 
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This action was commenced on behalf of the twenty-one individual 
plaintiffs to compel the retirement office to continue making the 
payments notwithstanding the enactment of Senate Bill 57. After filing 
of a stipulation of facts and a half day of argument, Judge Jay E. Banks 
granted a permanent order enjoining the retirement office from with-
holding payments to the individual plaintiffs. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In enacting House Bill 239 legislative intent was to accomplish 
what in fact was done in Senate Bill 57: i.e., the employment as a 
police chief for an employer other than the one from which such officer 
had "retired." The contention was made that our retirement system was 
making it virtually impossible for a police officer on the Wasatch 
front to compete with out of state applicants for appointment as a 
police chief in the outlying cities and communities because of the 
reduced compensation upon which the final average salary would be 
computed for retirement purposes. An officer may have had years and 
experience in Wasatch front law enforcement which would qualify him for 
a police chief appointment elsewhere in the State, but he could not 
afford the reducing effect upon his salary for subsequent retirement 
purposes. 
An additional argument was made that many police chief appoint-
ments being subject to political pressures and the pleasure of a city 
commissioner or council (the Spoils System) did not permit in practice 
the establishment of a retirement income in any event, and, another 
form of retirement or savings would be more appropriate than the State 
Public Safety Retirement System. 
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The legislature must have and retain the right to correct 
misinterpretation of its intent without intervening fixed contract 
rights which violate public policy and common sense. It is against 
the general welfare, public policy and common sense to assume that a 
class of public safety officials may be both employed full time as a 
police chief, sheriff or public safety commissioner and, at the same 
time, be ''retired11 from the same employment from which he is drawing 
a full salary. At the very least, legislation so interpreted should 
be clearly enunciated and its intent unclouded as a result of legisla-
tive floor debates. 
No argument is made that either the legislature or the retirement 
defendants may unconstitutionally impair retirement contracts. Indeed, 
the sanctity and immunity from legislative or agency meddling with 
vested retirement rights is an article of faith of these defendants, 
and they have gone to great lengths to defend this principle. But, 
the attaching of such contract rights in the factual situation here 
involved i_s denied by them. 
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ARGUMENT 
I NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS WERE 
ACQUIRED BY THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS BY 
REASON OF THE 1983 AMENDMENT TO 49-11-1, 
U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED 
It has been heretofore noted that the retirement defendants are 
not arguing that either they or the legislature can unconstitutionally 
impair fully vested and established contract rights to retirement 
benefits. It is respectfully suggested, nevertheless, that this case 
is not such a situation on its own facts, and that the right of the 
individual twenty-one plaintiffs here did not ripen into contract 
rights which could not be altered or amended by subsequent legislative 
action. 
Is the legislature bound by an interpretation of law made by an 
agency of the State contrary to its intent, which permanently 
established rights in individuals which cannot be abrogated by subse-
quent clarifying amendment? If the answer to this question is an 
unqualified affirmative then the judgment of the court below is entitled 
to affirmation without further inquiry. Contrarily, if there are facts 
and circumstances which could avoid the strict application of such a 
judicial rule then inquiry must be further directed to the facts of 
this case to determine the proper rule on these facts. We believe 
that sound public policy and common sense require that such inquiry 
be made and the facts of this case present an excellent reason for 
doing so. 
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The sole evidence on the question of legislative intent is the 
record of the floor debate in the House when House Bill 239 was 
submitted to the legislature (R-182-183). It is abundantly clear 
from this debate and the statements of its sponsor and others, that 
the Bill was not contemplated to accomplish the anomaly of permitting 
a class of pubiic safety individuals to draw retirement pay and 
continue working at the same job from which such "retirement" 
occurred at the same level of pay. It should be noted that to do 
so is in clear contravention of then and now existing law [49-11-34; 
49-11-37; 49-11-8(30)] which must then have been deemed to be repealed 
by implication, a condition not favored in the law. Glenn v. Perrel1, 
304 P2 380 - Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P2 480. 
In order to substantially alter and repeal existing law, 
particularly in an area of public policy such as this, we urge that 
it must be the clear intent of the legislature. The subcommittee and 
the body of the legislature must be apprised of the sponsors intent 
and be permitted to cast a vote in light of the stated intent. To 
allow individual rights to attach which cannot be altered by subse-
quent legislative action to correct an oversight or a misinterpretation 
is to shackle the state and its citizens with expense and consequence 
which should not be tolerated in the light of our citizen legislature 
and our established system of representative government. 
-8-
Where laws are subject to more •• • ' * -
reading requires repeal by implication rr *"e» -iws. •-<< es or - \ A \ " . -
tory construct iun i eoni rP'» H ivading in pard maiei 1^ ljo c J r h a *fl''*t. 
as to avoid repeal and qive effect to *"n nf t-hp ••-, - iSutherland 
Statu to Y y Construction, Fourth Edition . ^-.z* a reading 
is possitile and reasonahln in -t--- ^itea "- •'**-
floor debate are not in direct confhc* ,~ • •- -c. : 
or 49-1 i-J -" with 4-9-11-1. as amended - / *-*= .385 Legislate -
Senate P"] : ^ thp^f-
meaninq ^ M effect to each. 
Th -ia trial evert a pi io* — ^ o o e c - s interpreta-
tion o* •-e Constituti ; • ^d,/nr the statutory * * - y 
the r.o-jr-* onp< -".0' orevent a subsequent .:-^r^.;- • otero*"etatio-v it 
has - -- - iir:'' • strati ve - -'.•?•-» 
judicia -nterpretatio -v* .* 3-.. - .-., • -: - mnrrp-• 
the error cannot oe corrected in i oroner i.ase (Gallegos v. Midvale 
City, 49? P' i \ ) i ine ie<ji\iaunp HI<I U H P S H retirement defendants 
seek to do no more than that. 
While the complaint of the individual plaintiffs resounds with 
claims of "retroactive application" by the attempted enforcement of 
the 1985 Amendment, it is clear that no such action was taken or 
threatened by the Retirement defendants. No demand was made or 
contemplated which would have required these individuals to repay 
the sums received between the 1983 and the 1985 enactments. Both 
the law, as enacted in 1985, and the action of the retirement 
defendants was prospective, that is, to be applied after the 
effective date of the act. While it was contemplated that the 
flowing spigot of an unintended windfall would be shut off. no 
attempt was made or contemplated which would have required the 
flow to be poured back up the spigot. The legislature did not see 
fit to grandfather these individual plaintiffs and in the absence 
of such direction, the retirement defendants had no choice but to 
seek to cut off the thus unauthorized payments. 
Almost all legislation effectively alters individual rights. 
The right of persons to utilize various statutory schemes to avoid 
or delay taxes is a notable case in point. Having spent time and 
money to utilize such a statute does not result in "vested rights" 
or "contract rights" which may not subsequently be altered by 
legislation. 
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judicial notice that; the Reagan admits: a* - --^a — legislation 
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II "VESTED RIGHTS" IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE AND 
THIS COURT HAS HERETOFORE RECOGNIZED A 
"SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE" IN LIEU OF SUCH 
A RIGHT IN PUBLIC PENSION LAW 
The term "vested rights" is not defined by either the Federal or 
State Constitutions, has not been deemed to be an absolute, but rests 
in right reason and natural justice. The most authoritative source 
on statutory construction has further stated: 
And as explained by an eminent constitutional 
authority, as it is a right which rests upon 
equities it has reasonable limits and restrictions; 
it must have some regard to the general welfare and 
public policy; it cannot be a right which is to be 
examined, settled, and defended on a distinct and 
separate consideration of the individual case, but 
rather on broad and general grounds which embrace 
the welfare of the whole community, and which seek 
the equal and impartial protection of the interest 
of all. 
Sands Sutherland Statutory Construction. Fourth Edition, Vol. 2, 
P. 268, S 41,06, Statutes affecting vested rights. 
We respectfully suggest that on the facts this is a case where 
such inquiry is required. 
We have been unable to discover any law which supports the pro-
position that one can be "retired" and drawing retirement pay while 
still fully employed and paid for the same job from which he was 
"retired." Conversely, there is considerable law to support the 
amendment which the legislature considered it was passing in 1983. 
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That ruling is particularly apropos here when the facts and the 
alternatives are examined. This is not a case where an attempt is 
being made to deny a retirement benefit. Contrarily, should the 
Court reverse the lower court and permit the retirement defendants 
to implement the 1985 amendment, it is clear from the record (R-35) 
that each of these individual plaintiffs may indeed substantially 
enhance his retirement benefit. This is a procedural rather than a 
substantive change because it relates only to the time of taking a 
vested pension and not its availability, a reduction in amount, or 
divestment. (Pitcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P^ 
450). These individual plaintiffs would simply be denied an 
unintended windfall and be required to either retire or cease to 
draw retirement pay. Certainly these facts constitute a substantial 
substitute as required by Newcombe, supra. 
The retirement defendants have no quarrel with Driggs, supra. 
Indeed, the holding of that case is fully subscribed to on its facts. 
Were this Court to equate the facts in this case with those of Driggs, 
these defendants would prefer affirmation of the lower court. But we 
respectfully suggest that the facts are inapposite and require a 
different ruling. A distinction must be drawn between the vested 
contractural right of a specific identifiable pension, and a pension 
coupled with the right to continued employment in the position from 
which one has "retired." 
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CONCLUSION 
When the facts are fully considered in this case and the rules 
of law, equity, public policy and common sense are applied to them we 
respectfully submit that the retirement defendants are entitled to 
apply the 1985 amendment to these individual plaintiffs. While it 
may be argued that the monetary consequences as to these twenty-one 
individuals is not actuarially significant, the principle established 
if such relief is not granted may be highly significant. Curative 
legislation is generally looked upon with favor and enjoys the full 
presumption of constitutionality. It is clear that the legislature 
sought in 1985 to correct an unintended interpretation of the 1983 
amendment. Public policy requires that no rights .cleariy contrary to 
legislative intent may "vest" so that subsequent curative legislation 
is legally inoperative. Common sense and the general welfare support 
the proposition that one may not simultaneously work full time and 
draw full pay in employment from which he is "retired11 and drawing 
full retirement pay to which he would otherwise qualify. 
This Court is respectfully urged to reverse the order of the 
lower court and command judgment, no cause of action, for the 
retirement defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Matrk A. Madsen v 
A/ttorney at Law 
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants 
540 East Second South 
Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 84102 
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